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THE SENTENCING OF MENTALLY
DISORDERED OFFENDERS
By MARc E. SCHIFER*
There are no special sentences for mentally disordered offenders to be
found in Canada's Criminal Code, aside perhaps from the dangerous sexual2
offender provision' and the section disposing of insane accused persons.
Nevertheless, mental illness or disorder, though its presence requires no formal
adjudication, is a factor which judges are bound to consider before imposing
sentence. But while the law is settled that a failure to take due notice of all
relevant psychiatric data will provide grounds for appeal,8 it is by no means
clear what effect must be given to an offender's aberration once it has been
adverted to.
As a direct result of this dilemma, Canadian courts have, for the most
part, endeavoured to tailor the existing Criminal Code sanctions to fit the
mentally disordered offenders' amorphous dimensions. The result, unfortunately, has been a rather patchy and non-uniform design. By weaving provincial
mental health legislation into the fabric of Canadian criminal law, the courts
have occasionally succeeded in outfitting disordered offenders with a fashionable alternative to prison denims: straightlackets.
The aim of this paper is to outline the manner in which Canadian courts
have attempted to deal with the disposition of mentally abnormal offenders.
As will become apparent, the fate of any one such person depends generally
on a combination of three factors: the type of offence involved, the nature
of the offender's abnormality, and the philosophy of the sentencing judge.
In addition to explaining the mechanics of sentencing and enumerating the
variety of dispositions available to the courts, the discussion will deal with
some ethical problems concerning pre-sentence psychiatric information. In
the end, some conclusions will be drawn and an assessment made regarding
possible future alterations - both with regard to judicial sentencing policy
and the role of psychiatry in the sentencing process.
© Copyright, 1976, Marc E. Schiffer.
Marc Schiffer is a candidate for the degree of DJur., University of Toronto.
1 689 (3) Where the court finds that the accused is a dangerous sexual offender it

shall, notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada,
impose upon the accused a sentence of preventive detention in lieu of any other sentence
that might be imposed for the offence of which he was convicted or that was imposed
for such offence, or in addition to any sentence that was imposed for such offence if
the sentence has expired.
2 542(2) Where the accused is found to have been insane at the time when the
offence was committed, the court, judge or magistrate before whom the trial is held
shall order that he be kept in strict custody in the place and in the manner that the
court, judge or magistrate directs, until the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor of the
Province is known.
3

R. v. Roberts, 11963] 1 O.R. 280 (C.A.); R. v. Doran (1972), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 366

(Ont. C.A.).
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A. REMAND
When a trial judge wishes to have an offender psychiatrically examined
before imposing sentence, he may do so under the authority conferred by
sections 543(2) and 543 (2.1) of the Criminal Code. Sections 608.2(1) and
608.2(2) supply an identical procedure for the Court of Appeal. An alternative remand procedure, which is open to both trial and appeal court judges,
is that provided by provincial legislation such as Ontario's Mental Health
Act.4 Although it seems that the Code is more frequently selected, 5 this is
rather difficult to understand since The Mental Health Act would appear,
from a practical standpoint, to be far less cumbersome. While an order under
sections 543(2) or 608.2(1) generally requires the "evidence or, where the
prosecutor and the accused consent, . . . the report in writing, of at least one

duly qualified medical practitioner" to be given in support of the remand, 6
no such requirement exists in section 14(1) of The Mental Health Act.
Furthermore, the Code is unclear on the procedure
involved in obtaining the
7
necessary medical evidence in the first place.
At first blush, there does not appear to be a great deal of difference
between the tests which must be satisfied under both pieces of legislation in
order for a judge to remand. The Code requires the court to be of the opinion
that there is reason to believe that:
(a) an accused is mentally ill, or
(b) the balance of the mind of an accused is disturbed where the accused is a
female person charged with an offence arising out of the death of her newlyborn child.8 (emphasis added)

The Mental Health Act, by comparison, may be used wherever the judge
"has reason to believe '9 that the accused "suffers from mental disorder."'' 0
It is possible that the term "mental disorder" encompasses all of the terms
which the Code uses and more. As a result, persons not properly characterized
as being "mentally ill" or "unbalanced" may nevertheless be caught by section
14(1). For this reason the provincial legislation may be preferred by followers
4 R.S.O. 1970, c. 269.
5 In 1973 the Clarke nstitute of Psychiatry in Toronto admitted 50 patients remanded under the Criminal Code as compared with 35 remanded under The Mental
Health Act. Judges seem to prefer using the Code whenever the accused has been charged
under the Code. This may be because of a feeling that the word "offence", where it
appears in The Mental Health Act, refers only to an offence under provincial legislation
(e.g., The Liquor Control Act).
0
Prior to the passage of Bill C-71, no provision was made for the simple report
in writing of a medical practitioner.
7 The writer has been informed, from personal communication with provincial court
judges and forensic psychiatrists, that no difficulty really arises. Usually where mental
illness is suspected, the offender has been examined long before the dispositional stage.
8 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 543(2).
) In Ex Parte Branco, [1971] 2 O.R. 575 (H.C.) it was held that although a superior
court could decide whether there were reasonable grounds on which this discretion could
be exercised, the provincial court judge's exercise of the discretion could not itself be
reviewed.
10 Section 1(f) of the Act defines "mental disorder" as "any disease or disability
of the mind."
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of Thomas Szasz" or by judges who believe that certain offenders, such as
mental defectives, can more easily be called disordered than ill.
Although the statutory provisions are silent as to what will constitute
sufficient "reason to believe" that an offender fits the pertinent remand requirements, it may be helpful to limit the criteria upon which remand may
be ordered. While some might feel psychological screening to be an advisable
precaution in the case of all offenders, simple economics would seem to dictate
selectivity. For this reason, Walker's has given the following categories of
offenders priority with respect to remand:
1) the mature person who, after years of steady, respectable living, is unexpectedly
detected in some 'out of character' offence, such as embezzlement or assault;
and, as an extreme case, any first offender over sixty years of age;
2) at the other extreme, the offender with a history of persistent anti-social behaviour which fails to respond to ordinary correctives;
3) the offender whose offences have an irrational quality about them, especially
if they follow a stereotyped pattern (for example, the man who picks up and
then assaults prostitutes, or steals only women's clothing);
4) the offender who commits serious violence against members of his own family;
5) most sexual offenders, apart from those who have simply had intercourse with
willing girls just under the age of consent.

In actual practice, judicial use of the psychiatric remand procedures
seems to depend upon the personality of the sentencing judge as much as
upon that of the offender. Hogarth has noted a direct correlation between the
degree to which magistrates perceive mental disorder in offenders and the
degree to which they value rehabilitation over the other traditional goals of
sentencing. 13 While 44 per cent of those magistrates surveyed considered that
none or very few of the offenders appearing before them were mentally ill,
37 per cent felt that a significant minority were, and as many as 14 per cent
considered that most offenders were mentally ill.' 4 In assessing the data,
Hogarth has written:
Comparisons were made of the penal philosophy scores of magistrates who differed in the degrees of mental illness they perceived. The positive relationship of
belief in reformation to the proportion of offenders seen as mentally ill is very
11 Szasz maintains that the term "mental illness" is a gross misnomer. In The Myth
of Mental Illness (Revised ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1974) at x-xi, he has
written:
...I maintain that mental illness is a metaphorical disease: that bodily illness
stands in the same relation to mental illness as a defective television set stands to
a bad television programme. Of course, the word 'sick' is often used metaphorically. We call jokes 'sick', economies 'sick', sometimes even the whole world 'sick';
but only when we call minds sick do we systematically mistake and strategically
misinterpret metaphor for fact - and send for the doctor to 'cure' the 'illness'.
It is as if a television viewer were to send for a television repairman because he
dislikes the programme he sees on the screen.
12Walker, Sentencing in a Rational Society (Pelican, A-1108, 1972) at 127.
13 Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1971) at 85.
14 Id. at 84. The views of this latter groups were consistent with the belief of Lord
Hale who declared that "doubtless, most persons that are felons ... are under a degree
of partial insanity when they commit these offences."
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strong. In contrast, the amount of mental illness seen is negatively associated with

belief in general deterrence, retribution and incapacitation.'

5

At a later point in his research, he has concluded that:
.. . magistrates concerned about the treatment of offenders are more active in
their search for information than magistrates concerned to punish crime for deterrent or retributive purposes.1

Once the offender has been remanded where does he go and for how
long? Under sections 543(2) and 608.2(1) of the Code, he may be placed
in "such custody" as the court, judge or magistrate directs "for observation".
Theoretically, this could mean simple incarceration in the lock-up for thirty
days. In England it has been suggested that "the remand in custody process
is used as a punishment - as a mini-prison sentence in fact."'1 7 To what
extent this goes on in Canada is not known, although the Code's provisions
are clearly susceptible of being abused in a like manner. In contrast, section
14(1) of The Mental Health Act is more precise in its wording, providing
that the accused must be sent to a "psychiatric facility". In addition, section
16 offers the following insurance:
A judge shall not make an order under section 14 or 15 until he ascertains from
of the psychiatric
the senior physician of a psychiatric facility that the services
facility are available to the person named in the order.' 8

A potential source of difficulty with the Act, however, is that the maximum period of remand is longer here than in the Code. Under sections
543(2.1 ) (b) and 608.2(2) (b) of the Code, a remand for more than thirty
days (with a maximum of sixty days) can only be ordered when supported
by the evidence or report of at least one doctor. By section 14(3) of The
Mental Health Act such evidence is sufficient to commit the accused for an
indefinite period of treatment.
Until recently, section 14 was the only remand provision under which
examination could take place on an out-patient basis. With the passage of
Bill C-71, however, this situation has been remedied. In addition to remanding
the accused in custody, the courts are empowered under the Criminal Code
to "direct an accused to attend, at a place or before a person specified in the
order and within a time specified therein, for observation.... ."I The utility of
such procedure may be readily seen when one considers the fact that actual
20
examination time normally comprises only a fraction of the remand period.
Out-patient examination would seem particularly appropriate for a defendant
who is not in actual custody at the time the order is made. As Gunn has
15 Supra, note 13 at 85.
16 Id. at 238.
17 Gunn, Sentencing - As Seen by a Psychiatrist (1971), 11 Med. Sci. and the
Law 95 at 95.
18 Note that technically this provision relates solely to availability of psychiatric
services; it does not really guarantee an accused any right to examination or treatment.
1 Ss. 543 (2) (c) and 608.2(1) (a).
20 It should be kept in mind, however, that nothing prevents the court from ordering
a remand for less than thirty days or from having the accused returned from the psychiatric hospital before the period of remand has expired if the remainder of the time
is not required.
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pointed out, in cases where probationary out-patient treatment is to be the
court's ultimate disposal of the offender, "as little damage as possible will
have been done to the patient's social situation and the maximum therapeutic
potential preserved."'21
Regardless of whether the offender is remanded under The Mental Health
Act or under the Code, the expiration of the thirty or sixty day period by no
means ensures his return to the courtroom for sentencing. It is always possible
that the judge who has ordered the remand will receive a letter from the
psychiatric facility informing him that the offender has been admitted as an
"involuntary patient" by virtue of section 8 of The Mental Health Act.2 As
indicated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Fawcett v.
Attorney-Gen. for Ontario,23 provincial mental health provisions which operate
in this fashion are entirely intra vires. Even if the offender is in fact returned
to the courtroom, he may be certified immediately after sentence has been
24
passed.
One final flaw which should be noted with regard to sections 543(2) and
608.2(1) of the Code is that they do not require the examining psychiatrist
to submit a report of what he has discovered about the offender's mental state
during the period of "observation". Because observation is in itself useless
without such report, common practice is for the doctor to submit one anyway.
When remand has been ordered under The Mental Health Act, however,
section 14(2) requires that "the senior physician shall report in writing to
the judge as to the mental condition of the person."
B.

PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS

Psychiatrists who are called upon to furnish pre-sentence reports are
faced with numerous difficulties. First and foremost is the problem of diagnosis. According to Bartholomew, "[I]t is almost impossible to offer . . . a

definite psychiatric diagnosis in the majority of criminals."2 5 According to
Scott, whom Bartholomew has quoted:
In those cases selected for psychiatric report a classical diagnosis cannot be made
in more than 20 per cent. In the other 80 per cent it is impossible to attach a label
any more accurate than 'personality disorder' or 'social maladjustment'... .20
2

1 Supra, note 17 at 96.
22 8(1) Any person who,
(a) suffers from mental disorder of a nature or degree so as to require hospitalization in the interests of his own safety or the safety of others; and
(b) is not suitable for admission as an informal patient; may be admitted as an
involuntary patient to a psychiatric facility upon application therefore in the
prescribed form signed by a physician.
23 [1964] S.C.R. 625, aff'g (1962), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 942 (Ont. H.C.).
24 The use of this procedure is discussed later in the text. Sometimes the offender
is certified by a psychiatrist present in the courtroom for just such purpose. This is done
instantly upon the imposition of sentence.
25
Bartholomew, The Psychiatric Report for the Court [1962] Crim. L.R. 19 at 21.
26 Scott, Psychiatric Reports for Magistrates' Courts (1953), 4 Brit. J. Delinq. 1,
quoted by Bartholomew supra, note 25 at 21.
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While this state of affairs may simply illustrate the understatement that "the
science of psychiatry cannot provide absolutely certain answers to many
questions", 27 it may also be attributable to the distinct possibility that not all
offenders are mentally ill. Unfortunately, however, psychiatrists seem all too
often to overlook this contingency. Their reasons for doing so may either be
a conscious subscription to Roche's philosophy that "crime is a disturbance of
communication, hence a form of mental illness", 28 or else an over-zealous
response to the suspicions of the remanding judge. In either case, statistics
indicate that persons remanded for psychiatric assessment stand little chance
of being found completely normal,2 9 despite the examiner's frequent failure
to name their illnesses.
Bartholomew has argued that the lack of diagnostic precision on the
part of reporting psychiatrists is of no real consequence anyway. The mere
affixing of labels such as 'psychopathic personality' or 'borderline defective'
to an offender is of no assistance to the sentencing judge. Rather, it is in
supplying a general 'dynamic' assessment of the offender's psyche that the
examining psychiatrist can be most useful. In essence, a 'dynamic' or 'multifactorial' diagnosis is one which describes a mental phenomenon in terms of
the forces which caused or produced it.sO The formulation of such a diagnosis
naturally requires a great deal of information. In this regard, psychiatrists
are oftentimes impeded by the sentencing judges themselves. All too often,
Bartholomew has complained, judges fail to supply adequate information
concerning their reasons for remanding the accused in the first place:
Time and again one reads [on] the form sent from the court to the medical officer
under the heading 'Reasons which led the court to request a report on the accused's
state of mind' such phrases as 'Demeanour in court'; 'Previous mental history'
(without amplification); 'Nature of offence' (this included all sexual offences without differentiation). Phrases such as 'Not known' and 'For the guidance of the

more clearly the lack of interest and concern that courts
court' demonstrate even
8
can and do display. '

In gathering the information he needs, the psychiatrist, in addition to
examining the accused and running him through a battery of psychological
tests, may require previous hospital, prison or police records. He may also
consult with the offender's family and friends. Although, needless to say, a
great deal of hearsay will have transpired during the course of the doctor's

27

Roberts, Some Observations on the Problems of the ForensicPsychiatrist (1965),

Wis. 2L.8 Rev, 240 at 244.
Roche, The Criminal Mind: A Study of Communication Between Criminal Law
and Psychiatry (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1958) at 241. For criticism

of this philosophy, see Szasz, Law Liberty and Psychiatry: An Inquiry into the Social
Uses of Mental Health Practices (New York: Macmillan, 1963) at 91-108.
20 In a study made in 1966 in England, it was discovered that only 29% of those
persons remanded (143 out of a sample of 494) were considered by the examining
doctors to be mentally normal. See, Sparks, The Decision to Remand for Mental Exanination (1966), 6 Brit. J. Criminology 6 at 10, table II.
S0 Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses Routledge and Kegan, Paul.
(1946) at 11, cited by Bartholomew, supra, note 25 at 22.
31 Supra, note 25 at 30.
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inquiries, the Wilbandm case seems to have eliminated any and all problems
regarding the admissibility of evidence resulting therefrom.
The reporting psychiatrist's troubles are by no means over once he has
arrived at a diagnosis. A court does not, after all, remand an offender simply
to learn of his 'repressed libidinous fantasies' or 'latent homicidal tendencies'.
What the judge wants to know is whether he is treatable and whether he is
dangerous. It is of little comfort to know that the offender's uncontrollable
urge to set fire to chickens stems from a neurotic fear of liverwurst.
Although in Regina v. Robinson3 the court was told that there was a
66-70 per cent chance of the offender's being "cured" by psychotherapy, such
predictions are rare indeed. The cautious psychiatrist is more likely to maintain
that "one really cannot give prognostic 'odds' as to the efficacy of psychotherapy";3 4 he prefers to state the minimum period of time which would be
required to treat the patient effectively. But even this type of estimate should
be taken with a grain of salt, for there is no guarantee that the doctor who
offers such a prediction will be the one who ultimately treats the offender.
Regardless of whether or not a satisfactory answer can be given, it is at
least legitimate to question a physician concerning the results one might
expect from the therapy he offers. It is doubtful, however, whether an individual's dangerousness is a matter which a physician ought properly to be
called on to assess. Unlike curability, dangerousness is not a subject ostensibly
within his field of expertise. It is no wonder, therefore, that psychiatrists feel
uncomfortable about expressing opinions on the topic. McCaldon has stated:
As a psychiatrist I am frequently asked to make an assessment with regard to possible future dangerousness of a patient, and I must confess that I can find no firm
psychiatric criteria for so doing.... It is unlikely that there are any psychiatrists
who can predict dangerousness in a number of individuals with a high level of
accuracy 35

It is, for that matter, unlikely that anyone possesses what could be called an
expertise in the area of gauging dangerousness. As Halleck has pointed out:
Research in the area of dangerous behaviour (other than generalizations from case
material) is practically nonexistent. Predictive studies which have examined the
probability of recidivism have not focused on the issue of dangerousness. If the
psychiatrist or any other behavioural scientist were asked to show proof of his
predictive skills, objective data could not be offered.38

For this reason, Morris has argued that dangerousness ought to be rejected

as a basis for imposing sentences of imprisonment3

7

In doing so, he would

32 [1967] S.C.R. 14.
33 [1975] 19 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (Ont. C.A.) at 196.
S4 Bartholomew, Some Problems of the Psychiatrist in Relation to Sentencing (1973),

15 Crim. L.Q. 325 at 334.
35

McCaldon, Reflections on Sentencing (1974), 16 Can. J. Crimin. and Corr.
291 at 295.
36
Halleck, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime: A Study of Causes, Punishment
and Treatment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971) at 314.
3

7

Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1974) at 62.
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seem to have adopted the philosophy of Wharton, who described the preventive theory of criminal justice as one which "contradicts one of the fundacrime,
mental maxims of English common law, by which not a tendency to
but simply crime itself can be made the subject of a criminal issue."'38
Those who adhere to the validity of 'dangerousness' as a workable
criminological concept have offered us little in the way of criteria for detecting
its presence. Psychiatry's time-honoured epitome of evil incarnate is the
ubiquitous psychopath. Also called the sociopath, our elusive stereotype has
been credited 30 with the following rather unflattering attributes:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)

Superficial charm and good "intelligence".
Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking.
Absence of "nervousness" or psycho-neurotic manifestations.
Unreliability.
Untruthfulness and insincerity.
Lack of remorse or shame.
Inadequately motivated anti-social behaviour.
Poor judgment and failure to learn by experience.
Pathological egocentricity and incapacity for love.
General poverty in major affective reactions.
Specific loss of insight.
Unresponsiveness in general inter-personal relations.
Fantastic and uninviting behaviour with drink and sometimes without.
Suicide rarely carried out.
Sex life impersonal, trivial and poorly integrated.
Failure to follow any life plan.

None of us is perfect.
Aware that few really dangerous persons wear "I AM A PSYCHOPATH" buttons, McCaldon 40 had devised his own checklist of ingredients
for gauging dangerousness. The characteristics, though they may not add up
to stark raving psychopathy, are hardly what one looks for in the ideal babysitter:
1) A history of violent outbursts, especially if such history involves cruelty to
animals.
2) Fragmented basic relationships such as broken home, unhappy marriage, etc.
3) Exposure to hostile or anti-social environment.
4) Violence is seen by the offender as one of the means of his expressing self-

esteem.
5) A blockage or lack of attainment in normal supportive relationships such as
love, sexual relationships, work, friends, etc.
6) A rather schizoid or border-line psychotic mental state at the time of examination.

The problem with these criteria, as with those relating to psychopathy, is that

their relevance in the prediction of future criminal behaviour is not supported
by empirical data.
Perhaps the most serious ethical issue facing a reporting psychiatrist
88

Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed., 1932) s. 2.
30 Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity (St. Louis: Mosby, 1955) at 380-81, cited in
Nemeth, Psychopathic Personality - Its Relevance in the Correctional After Care
Agency (1961), 3 Can. J. Corr. at 128-29.
40
Supra, note 35 at 295-96.
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arises after his assessments of the offender's curability and dangerousness have
been made. It concerns the inclusion in his report of recommendations pertaining to the actual disposition of the offender. Although some authorities
regard it as clearly improper for a psychiatrist to advocate the imposition of
one sentence over another, 41 Bartholomew has maintained that:
a recommendation is implicit in the initial request for a medical and/or psychiatric report. To suppose that the court only requests a diagnostic formulation
but does not want any recommendations as to possible 'treatment', or the best
method of dealing with the case, is hardly to the credit of the court and would
be utterly illogical. 2

Insofar as an opinion regarding the most effective form of psychotherapy
would be difficult to divorce from an endorsement of that treatment, Bartholomew is probably correct in asserting the illogicality of such separation. And
it would, of course, be odd for an examining psychiatrist to characterize an
individual as treatable without naming the treatment he has in mind. However, the assertion that psychiatrists are logically entitled to advise the court
as to the relative values of all forms of sentence is one which must be seriously
questioned.
Scott has asserted 43 that psychiatrists should never include recommendations for punishment in their reports to the court. The problem with applying
this rule, however, lies in the susceptability of the word "punishment" to
divergent interpretations. What an offender views as punishment may be seen
as treatment by the psychiatrist. When dealing in the area of psychotherapy
it is often difficult (if not impossible) to distinguish the two. Indeed, citing
the use of aversion therapy, Gunn has observed that "punishment is of course
not entirely alien to psychiatry." 44 Because many psychiatrists view punishment as therapeutic in some circumstances, they may feel unrestrained in
recommending whatever form of disposition they deem appropriate in the
interests of rehabilitation. For this reason, Bartholomew has asserted the
legitimacy of psychiatric recommendations for imprisonment:
..it must be realized that imprisonment is not simply what is left over when all
other sanctions have been tried and found to fail or have been rejected in the first
place. Imprisonment can be therapeutic and rehabilitative in a number of

cases... .45

Psychiatrists who view punishment as therapeutic consider one of its uses to
be the alleviation of guilt feelings on the part of certain offenders. 46 In illustrating this theory Gunn has reported the following case history:
41
See, Page, Sentence of the Court (London: Faber and Faber, 1948) at 170,
cited by Bartholomew supra, note 25 at 23.
42
Supra, note 25 at 23. Citing a study made by Radzinowicz, Sexual Offences
(London: MacMillan, 1957) at 74, the author notes that most psychiatric reports do
in fact contain recommendations as to the disposal of the prisoner.
43
Scott, Psychiatric Reports for Magistrates' Courts (1953), 4 Brit. J. Delinq.
1, cited by Bartholomew, supra, note 25 at 24.
44
Gunn, Sentencing - As Seen by a Psychiatrist (1971), 11 Med. Sci. and the
Law 95 at 97.
45
Supra, note 25 at 24-25.
46
Grnn, supra, note 44 at 97.
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A man, many years ago, remonstrated with his wife's lover, the inevitable fight
ensued and the interloper was killed. The man was subsequently convicted of
manslaughter. At the time he suffered unbearable guilt and prayed for a stiff punishment. The court took a more lenient view of his behaviour and gave him a
conditional discharge. He was amazed and appalled. He felt that he had been deprived of a chance to redeem himself and ran away from home and drowned his
sorrows in drink. Since that time he has been a severe and persistent alcoholic
and is convinced that if he had a reasonable 47
punishment - say two or three years
in prison - he would not have deteriorated.

With all due respect to the chronicler, the credibility of this little melodrama
seems a bit thin. One fails to see how staring at a cockroach crawling across
the ceiling of his jail cell for three years would have brightened up the offender's outlook on life.
Even if one accepts the legitimacy of therapeutic punishment, a psychiatrist's expertise in matters of psychic rehabilitation will not in itself justify
all recommendations he makes with regard to sentence. As the case of R. v.

Doucet 8 illustrates, a psychiatrist may well base his advice on entirely unrelated considerations. In Doucet the reporting doctors advocated a sentence
of imprisonment for the purposes of general as well as specific deterrence.
A final problem with psychiatric reports concerns their confidentiality.
Until the 1968-69 parliamentary session, the general rule in this regard was
that set out in Rex v. Benson and Stevenson,4 9 a decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal. In that case it was held that offenders should be
informed of the substance of any detrimental information contained in presentence reports, in order that they might explain or deny it. A crucial exception to this rule was made, however, with regard to psychiatric data, the
court saying:
In an earlier part of these reasons I referred to an observation by Goddard L.CJ.
in R. v. Dickson in dealing with the statutory obligation to furnish the prisoner or
his counsel with a copy of the representations made to the Court by the Prison
Commissioners. He said in part: 'In some cases I think it very undesirable, because
it may sometimes give him ideas about his mental condition which he perhaps
should not know.' I am in complete agreement with that statement, - if I may
say so with deference. And for this reason: The fact that a convicted person is
suffering from some mental disorder is not a factor which should in ordinary cases
influence a Court to impose a higher sentence than would be imposed upon a man
of normal mentality. It is not a fact damaging or detrimental to him in the sense
that it would lead to the imposition of a heavy sentence in the ordinary run of
cases.

There are cases, involving, for instance, sexual crimes, where the Court might well
consider the mental instability of the convict renders him a menace to society but
it seems to me in that class of an allegation of that fact contained in a Probation
Officer's report is of little value standing alone. A psychiatric examination conducted by a doctor qualified in that field is the method to determine that fact. The
examining doctor would be the best judge as to whether or not the result of his
examination should be fully disclosed to the convict50 (emphasis added)

47 Id.
48 [1971] 1

O.R. 705 (C.A.) at 706.
(1951), 100 C.C.C. 247.
5o Id. at 261.
49
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With the enactment of section 662(2) of the present Criminal Code the
above exception would seem to have been effectively extinguished insofar as
it applied to psychiatric information in the hands of the probation officer.
Section 662 reads:
(1) Where an accused, other than a corporation, pleads guilty to or is found
guilty of an offence, a probation officer shall, if required to do so by a court,
prepare and file with the court a report in writing relating to the accused for the
purpose of assisting the court in imposing sentence or in determining whether the
accused should be discharged pursuant to section 662.1.
(2) Where a report is filed with the court under subsection (1), the clerk of the
court shall forthwith cause a copy of the report to be provided to the accused or
his counsel and to the prosecutor.
It is to be noted that this section makes no reference whatsoever to information filed by persons other than the probation officer. With respect to
reports filed by the examining psychiatrist personally, the Benson and

Stevenson exception would therefore appear to have been left intact. Supportive of this view is the wording of section 17 of Ontario's Mental Health
Act. It provides:
Notwithstanding this or any other Act or any regulation made under any other
Act, the senior physician may report all or any part of the information compiled
by the psychiatric facility to any person where, in the opinion of the senior physician, it is in the best interests of the person who is the subject of an order made
under section 14 or 15.

C.

POSSIBLE SENTENCES

Nowadays it is commonly assumed in the case of mentally disordered
offenders that rehabilitation is the prime consideration for the sentencing judge
and that it takes precedence over traditional punitive goals. Thomas has in
fact suggested that:
Where the offender can be shown to be in need of psychiatric treatment, and the
necessary treatment is available in an appropriate setting, the Court will normally
make an appropriate order without regard to considerations of deterrence and
retribution.... There are some cases in which this approach is not evident, but
they are clearly exceptional. 5 (emphasis added)

If this is an accurate description of sentencing policy in England, it is doubtful
whether it reflects a universally accepted philosophy or practice. Because conviction has historically denoted responsibility, North American jurists have
shown reluctance to depart from the logic that those who are mentally blameworthy 52 should be punished. As Halleck has noted, "punishability is equated
with the criminal's responsibility for his actions."' '
51

Thomas, Principles of Sentencing (London: HIeinemann, 1970) at 257.
Le., those who, in the case of most offences, have been adjudged to have had
mens rea.
53 Supra, note 36 at 207. Even in England, where the rehabilitative ideal is said to
flourish, one still finds judicial reasoning like that of Lord Parker, CJ. in Regina v.
Morris, [1961] 2 Q.B. 237 at 243:
Of course there may be cases where, although there is a substantial impairment of
responsibility, the prisoner is shown on the particular facts of the case nevertheless
to have some responsibility for the act he has done, for which he must be
punished... (emphasis added)
52
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More than twenty years ago an American psychoanalyst named Waelder
suggested a movement away from the imposition of punitive sanctions as an
inevitable consequence of conviction. He stated:
It seems advisable, first of all, to reformulate our laws in such a way that they
are no longer focussed on punishment of crime with other dispositions taking
their place as exceptions from the rule ...

He went on to recommends the following tables as a guide to sentencing:
Symbol

Disposition

Diagnostic Characterization

1, 1, 1

Dangerous
Deterrable
Treatable

Punishment and
Treatment

1, 1, 2

Dangerous
Deterrable
Not treatable

Punishment

1, 2, 1

Dangerous
Not deterrable
Treatable

Preventive Custody
and Treatment

1, 2, 2

Dangerous
Not deterrable
Not treatable

Preventive Custody

2, 1, 1

Not dangerous
Deterrable
Treatable

Punishment with
Probationary Period
and Treatment

2, 1, 2

Not dangerous
Deterrable
Not treatable

Punishment, perhaps
with Probationary
Period

2, 2, 2

Not dangerous
Not deterrable
Not treatable

Release

It is submitted that Canada's courts have not yet fully embraced the
rehabilitative ideal. Whether or not they articulate their reasons, Canadian
judges seem to be operating on a rationale more closely resembling that proposed by Waelder than the one which Thomas has described. Consequently,
the sanctions to which mentally abnormal offenders are liable today may entail
anything from simple punishment, to elaborate psychotherapy, to a combination of the two.
1.

Fine
This form of sanction has, on occasion, been employed as a method of
dealing with abnormal persons convicted of relatively minor offences. Clearly
5 Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility (1952), 101
U. of Penn. L. Rev. 378 at 389.
O5 Id. at 390.
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the purpose behind the imposition of a fine is punitive rather than rehabilitative. By punishing the offender, the Court seeks only to deter such person
from exhibiting the symptoms of his supposed affliction in an unlawful manner;
it is not concerned with bringing about a 'cure'.
The offence of committing an act of gross indecency56 in public5" is one
for which some judges have considered the levying of a fine suitable. In R. v.
Five Accused Persons5 s Rice, Prov. Ct. J., imposed $100 and $200 fines on
several confirmed homosexuals, stating his reasons for so doing as follows:
I can see no purpose in suspending sentence. The accused are confirmed homosexualists and have not indicated that they intend to fight off this disease. Even if
they did, I doubt whether they could. I do not know how far a successful medical
treatment has progressed in this field.... I have come to the conclusion that until
some other mode of punishment is devised a fine with the alternative of a gaol
sentence should be imposed on first offenders - and all the accused are such.
There is no need for me to deal with second offenders at this stage. As long as
this revolting and sickening offence is a crime, the law can only punish; it is not
for courts to prescribe treatment; this is a matter for medical science. It is also
not a matter for the courts to say how and where these unfortunates should be
incarcerated. There are experts in that field.5 9

Similarly, in R. v. Boisvert and Lupien60 fines of $100 and $750 were
imposed by a British Columbia County Court for an offence under section
157. It is important to note that this section provides for a maximum of five
years imprisonment, thus making fine possible in lieu of imprisonment under
section 646(1) of the Code. 61 Where the offence is a more serious one and is
punishable by more than five years imprisonment, a fine may be imposed
63
only in addition to another authorized punishment.6 Thus in R. v. Marple
four defendants convicted of indecent assault on a male person" were given
56 Criminal Code, supra, note 8, s. 157.
57 S. 158 of the Code provides in part:
158.(1) Sections 155 and 157 do not apply to any act committed in private between
(a) a husband and his wife, or
(b) any two persons each of whom is twenty-one years or more of age, both of
whom consent to the commission of the act.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1),
(a) an act shall be deemed not to have been committed in private if it is committed
in a public place, or if more than two persons take part or are present.
58 (1961), 4 Crim. L.Q. 124 (Man. Prov. Ct.).
59 Id. at 124-25.
60 he decision on sentence is reported by Sanders, Sentencing of Homosexual Offenders (1967-68) 10 Crim. L.Q. 25 at 29. The case of Regina v. Lupien reached the Supreme Court of Canada on a point of expert evidence and is reported in [1970] S.C.R. 263.
01 646(1) An accused who is convicted of an indictable offence punishable with
imprisonment for five years or less may be fined in addition to or in lieu of any other
punishment that is authorized, but an accused shall not be fined in lieu of imprisonment
where the offence of which he is convicted is punishable by a minimum term of
imprisonment.
62 Section 646(2) of the Code provides:
(2) An accused who is convicted of an indictable offence punishable with imprisonment for more than five years may be fined in addition to, but not in
lieu of, any other punishment that is authorized.
63 (1973), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 389 (CA.).
64 Section 156 provides a maximum sentence of ten years for this offence.
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a perfunctory prison term of one day and fined in the amount of $500. On
appeal by the Crown, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal refused to impose a
longer term of imprisonment on the grounds that imprisonment would not
rehabilitate the offenders and that the fine constituted an adequate deterrent.
5 an individual
In the more recent case of R. v. DobsonG
convicted of buggery
under section 155 (which carries a maximum of fourteen years) was sentenced
to one day's imprisonment to be followed by a three year probation period
and was ordered to pay a $600 fine as well. While the trial judge's purpose
in handing down this sentence was clearly a punitive one, it is interesting that
the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal saw fit to vary the probation order by making
psychiatric treatment a further condition thereof. In doing so, the Court of
Appeal obviously saw nothing contradictory in the aims of punishment and
rehabilitation.
2.

Probation
(a) Following imprisonment
Judicial recognition that an offender requires psychiatric attention does
not necessarily result in the abandonment of such penological considerations
as deterrence and retribution. Waelder has pointed out, however, that rehabilitation is generally made more difficult as deterrent or retributive punishment is increased. 6 Capital punishment, for example, tends to make rehabilitation impossible. But short of this ultimate sanction, terms of imprisonment have been considered by judges as not altogether incompatible with the
rehabilitative ideal. As Waelder has put it:
Whenever our goals conflict, we have to weigh how much of each of these purposes can be achieved and how much sacrifice in terms of one goal is necessary
for the partial realization of another one.67

It has been argued with great force that the simultaneous combination of punishment and treatment within a penal institution is counterproductive in terms of rehabilitation. 8 Prison, after all, is hardly the ideal
therapeutic environment. It is perhaps for this reason, therefore, that some
courts have adopted the 'punish now, treat later' approach to sentencing.
Utilizing the authority conferred on them by sections 663(1) (b) 69 and 663
05 (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 81 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).

G6 Supra, note 54 at 388.
67 Id. at 388-89.
68 Supra, note 36 at 286, where
The psychiatrist who ventures to offer his services to a prison ... is dismayed to
find himself part of a system that is dedicated to the infliction of psychological
pain. In fact, the prison environment is almost diabolically conceived to force the
offender to experience the pangs of what many psychiatrists would describe as
mental illness. A brief look at the prison environment will indicate that it contains
the most pernicious factors that are listed as causes of mental illness in our
psychiatric textbooks.
69 663(1) Where an accused is convicted of an offence the court may, having
regard to the age and character of the accused, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, ...
(b) in addition to finding the accused or sentencing him to imprisonment,
whether in default or payment of a fine or otherwise, for a term not exceeding two years, direct that the accused comply with the conditions
prescribed in a probation order; ....
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(2) (h),70 judges have chosen to place suitable offenders on probation, making psychiatric treatment (usually on an out-patient basis) a condition thereof,
71
but only after they have served short terms of imprisonment. R. v. De Coste
is a case in point. There the defendant pleaded guilty to two charges of indecent
assault and was sentenced by the trial court to eighteen months imprisonment.
On appeal, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal took notice of the fact that he
had previously been a psychiatric patient and was diagnosed as schizophrenic.
The sentence was varied as follows:
In view of all the circumstances of this case, including the fact that the appellant
has no previous record, we consider that the protection of the public would best
be served here by making every effort consistent with observance of the principle
of deterrence to ensure that the appellant obtain further psychiatric treatment as
soon as possible.
It is the unanimous opinion of the Court that the sentence be varied to three
months in the Halifax County Correction Centre, that the appellant receive psychiatric treatment forthwith, and that he be placed on probation for a period of
two years and comply with the conditions of a probation order which shall include
those set out in s. 663(2) (a), (d), (f) and (g) of the Code, and the further condition, which we regard as of the utmost importance, that he attend and receive
such psychiatric treatment as the probation officer shall arrange. 72 (emphasis
added)

(b) Following a conditional discharge or suspended sentence
Sections 662.1(2) and 663(1)(a) provide for the imposition of a
probation order in cases where the accused has received a conditional discharge or suspended sentence, respectively. Resort to this form of disposition

is an obvious sign of judicial adoption of the treatment model. Judges most
commonly use this alternative in the case of persons convicted of non-violent

sexual offences who are not considered a sufficient danger to the community
to require imprisonment. Such sentence has, for example, been employed in
cases like R. v. Holte and Landry,73 R. v. La Chance and Bliss,74 R. v. Desjarlaisand Ferguson75 and R. v. HerrmannandSinger" as a method of dealing
with homosexuals convicted of acts of gross indecency in public. It has also

been used with great frequency in the sentencing of pedophiles. In the case

of Regina v. Doran77 a school teacher who had been convicted on two charges

of indecently assaulting young girls had been sentenced to a prison term of
70 (2) The following conditions shall be deemed to be prescribed in a probation
order, namely, that the accused shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour and shall
appear before the court when required to do so by the court, and, in addition, the court
may prescribe as conditions in a probation order that the accused shall do any one or
more of the following things specified in the order, namely....
(h) comply with such other reasonable conditions as the court considers
desirable for securing the good conduct of the accused and for preventing
a repetition by him of the same offence or the commission of other
offences.
71 (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 94 (N.S.S.C.A.D.).
72 d. at 95-96.
73 Unreported but cited by Sanders, supra, note 60 at 27.
4
7 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.

77 [1971] 2 O.R. 405 (C.A.).
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twelve months definite and six months indeterminate. On appeal the sentence
was varied to time served and the accused placed on two years probation on
the condition that he submit to treatment on an out-patient basis at Toronto's
Clarke Institute. The Court rested its decision upon the following line of
reasoning:
We have before us material not presented to the trial judge which disclosed that
if the appellant were to continue his treatment with Dr. Tisdall and also take
treatment at the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry the chance of being cured is
favourable. If such treatment outside the prison is likely to effect such a cure,
and his imprisonment may not, we think that it is in the general interest of society
to have him treated rather than imprisoned.7 8

This statement represents what is perhaps the classic rationale behind the

use of probationary psychiatric treatment. It articulates the widely held belief
that psychotherapy, if it is to be effective at all, is most properly conducted
outside the prison environment.?9 Recognizing that the locking of an individual
behind bars may not be the ideal way to effect his healthy readjustment to
society, it advances an alternative method of psychic rehabilitation which,
though coerced, seems rather more workable.
The assumption that compulsory psychiatric treatment is either more
efficacious or more ethical when the coercive force (in this case, the threat
of imprisonment) remains hidden, is one which invites examination. With
respect to coerced therapy generally, Jonas Rappeport has asserted that "enforced treatment is nonetheless treatment and can, in fact, produce changes
which are desirable from the standpoint of the individual and society."8' 0
Regarding the effectiveness of probationary treatment on an out-patient basis
he has made the following observation:
The sex offender statistics published by Turner and Mohr from Toronto8 l and by
Peters in Philadelphia, and inthe initial data that we have developed from almost
two years of an enforced group therapy program, have indicated that when close
probation supervision forces patients to attend, very satisfactory results can be
obtained by outpatient treatment of those with repeated offences. Those clinics
that have no8 2means of enforcing attendance at treatment sessions have repeatedly
poor results.

In a similar vein, Melitta Schmideberg has posited that offenders rarely
become internally motivated toward rehabilitation unless acted upon by
external forces:
Rehabilitation is possible only if the offender wishes to change. To make the very
great effort which is necessary the offender needs a strong motivation. This usually
stems from a deterrent that has really shaken him. Thus, rehabilitationdepends on

Id. at 406.
79 See, R. v. Hough, [1965] Crim. L.R. 665 where England's Court of Criminal
Appeal utilized probationary psychotherapy in express recognition of the fact that imprisonment would prejudice the chances of therapy being successful.
80 Rappeport, Enforced Treatment - Is It Treatment? (1974), 2 Bulletin of the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 148 at 148.
81 The author cites Turner and Mohr, Pedophilia and Exhibitionism (Toronto: U.
of Toronto Press).
s2 Supra, note 80 at 150.
78
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83
the (open or implied) threat on the one hand, and on the hope on the other.
(emphasis added)

Unfortunately, reasoning of this sort leads us into some rather serious legal
and ethical difficulties. Can an offender who has been coerced into treatment
ever be said to have given his voluntary informed consent thereto?8 4 Curiously
enough, Schmideberg's very choice of words is strongly reminiscent of the
familiar legal test for assessing the voluntariness of confessions. In Walker v.
The King85 the Supreme Court of Canada decided that any "fear of prejudice
or hope of advantage held out by a person in authority" would vitiate the
essential element of volition. By analogy, the hope and fear evoked by the
sentencing judge who makes psychotherapy a condition of probation would
seem to negative the offender's consent to such treatment.8 6 On the other hand,
it may be argued that the probationer's predicament needn't negative his
87
capacity to consent at all. He may sincerely wish to be treated. Why should

the threat of imprisonment negate freedom of choice? Citizens who are not
on probation are also threatened by imprisonment, yet can it be said that
whenever persons obey the law they are doing so involuntarily? Hopefully, it
is not merely legal constraint which prevents a person from attacking his
neighbour with a chain saw!
So much for the legal arguments. As an ethical justification for coerced
psychotherapy, Rappeport has offered the traditional common sense argument:
It has generally been accepted and recognized that the criminal convicted of a
crime against persons may not have a right to continue such behaviour and remain
free. The law, whose very essence is the protection of society, has a right to prevent
him from continuing such behaviour by incarcerating him or, at least, placing him
under supervision. It would then seem to follow that the law also has the right
which will change his behaviour so
to force him to enter a treatment program
that he no longer harms other persons.88
83
Schmideberg, Re-evaluating the Concepts of Rehabilitation and Punishment
(1968), 12 Internat. I. Offender Therapy 25. This philosophy is not new amongst criminologists. In 1895 Wines wrote that "no treatment will produce the best result unless
the consent and cooperation of the criminal patient are secured. For this an adequate
motive . . . is essential ... the hope of freedom... '
84 From basic principles, it is clear that medical treatment in the absence of prior
voluntary informed consent will generally constitute battery: Younts v. St. Francis
Hospital and School of Nursing, Inc. (1970), 205 Kan. 292; Mohr v. Williams (1905),
95 Minn. 261; Pratt v. Davis (1906), 224 Ill. 300; Tabor v. Scobel (1952), 254 S.W.
2d 474 (Ky. C.A.); Lacey v. Laird (1956), 166 Ohio St. 12; Rolater v. Strain (1914),
39 Okla. 572. Nor does the offender's status as such dispense with the necessity of
obtaining such consent: Kaimowitz et al v. Department of Mental Health (Mich.), unreported, June 10, 1973, No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne Co. Circuit Ct.).
85 [1939] S.C.R. 214 at 217, per Duff, CJ.C.
8
6 Thus rendering the psychotherapist liable to civil action?
87
InRegina v. Leech, [1973] 1 W.W.R. 744 (Alta. S.C.) at 756 a psychiatric witness
testified:
As a matter of fact [the accused] begged me for psychiatric help. He said that he
was frightened if he went to prison that when he would get out he might repeat
these acts, and he wanted some form of treatment whereby he would not act in a
similar manner.
s Supra, note 80 at 149.
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The problem with this statement as an expression of general policy is that it
makes no distinction between the gravity of different offences. It suggests that
an individual's "right to be different", as Kittrie has called it, is forfeited upon
the commission of any crime, regardless of how trivial it might be.89
Although there may be legal as well as moral limitations upon the State's
right to alter criminal behaviour, 90 the risk of probationary psychotherapy
exceeding those limits is no doubt decreased (owing to diminished opportunity) from that which exists in the case of in-patient psychotherapy. Nevertheless it is significant that some courts have preferred not to make psychiatric
treatment a strict condition of probation even where they have felt such treatment advisable. In an apparent attempt to remove the coercive element from
the psychiatrist-patient relationship, they have merely offered their recommendation that the probationer undergo psychotherapy. Thus in Regina v.
H.01 an Ontario County Court sentenced a pedophile who had been convicted
on several counts of indecent assault to twelve months probation with only
the usual conditions. The Court further advised the accused, however, to
'voluntarily' attend as an out-patient at Toronto's Forensic Clinic. In Regina
v. Alien9 2 where the offender had been sentenced on similar charges to two
years imprisonment, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reduced the
sentence to time served without imposing probation at all. In stating its reasons
the Court noted that the appellant
had "recognized the urgency of continuing
93
regular psychiatric treatment.1
Implicit in the use of out-patient psychotherapy as an alternative to imprisonment is a rejection by the Court of general deterrence as a silent consideration in the circumstances. In Doran the Court felt that:
[dleterrence in this case is of small moment because the Court is of the view that
the appellant suffers from an illness, as do all pedophiles; they are not deterred by
punishment to others.94

This is not to say, however, that probationary psychiatric treatment may be

ordered in the case of all non-deterrable offenders. Before selecting this form
of sentence, the court will generally require assurance that the accused's condition is treatable 5 and that his being at large will not unduly endanger the
89 Rappeport has stated simply (at 149) that "[w]hile the mentally ill may, in
Nicholas Kittrie's terms, have a right to be different, this right may be allowed only as
long as this difference does not 'interfere' with someone else."
00

See, supra, note 84. See, also, Knecht v. Gillman (1973), 488 F. 2d 1136 (8th

Cir.) where aversive therapy was challenged as being cruel and unusual punishment.
There the court held: (1) that the mere characterization of a drug's administration as
"treatment" did not make it immune from Eighth Amendment scrutiny; and (2) that
use of an emetic drug as an "aversive stimulus" constituted cruel and unusual punishment unless voluntary informed consent were first obtained. No Canadian cases have
yet arisen, however, in which behaviour therapy has been challenged under section 2(b)
of the CanadianBill of Rights.
91 (1965-66), 8 Crim. L.Q. 11.

92 (1954), 108 C.C.C. 239.
93 Id. at 244.
9
4Supra, note 77 at 407.
O5 See, the cases of Hardy, Silver and Wyer, cited by Thomas, supra, note 51 at
259-60 n. 5.
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public. 96 Furthermore, the offender must meet the requirements of eligibility
contained in the Code's conditional discharge or suspended sentence provisions. The former9 7 excludes persons found guilty of offences punishable by
a minimum term, fourteen years, life, or death; the latter98 excludes those
convicted of crimes for which a minimum punishment is prescribed. This
limitation on the use of probation would seem to indicate an unwillingness on
the part of Parliament to abandon retribution in the case of more serious
offences, regardless of the offender's mental state. Interestingly, the gravity
of the crime does not seem to be a relevant consideration in England; probation orders have been imposed for offences such as arson9 9 and attempted
murder.100
Apart from the ethical problems involved in making psychotherapy a
condition of probation, there are several practical difficulties inherent in the
use of this form of disposition. To begin with, although the Code allows under
section 663 (2) (h) for psychiatric treatment to be made a condition of probation, it contains no provision which compels the psychiatric institution to
accept the probationer as a patient. This means that unless the reporting
psychiatrist is in a position to know for certain that a particular clinic or
hospital will accept the offender if released on probation, the individual runs
the risk of involuntarily violating his probation. 1 ' In England such risk is
eliminated in part by section 4 of the CriminalJustice Act, 1948 (as amended
by Schedule 7 to the Mental HealthAct, 1959), which provides that the court
must be satisfied that suitable arrangements have been made before including
in a probation order a requirement that the offender submit to in-patient
treatment.
Another potential problem lies in the fact that the psychiatrist who
reports to the sentencing court needn't be the one in whose care the offender
will be released. Although he might consider the accused suitable for treatment, the facility to whom he is eventually referred may disagree and discharge
him from treatment after one session. 02 The result, once again, is that the
offender may be placed in violation of his probation. A similar situation may
occur even where the reporting psychiatrist is in fact the one who eventually
undertakes to treat the accused. Once released, the offender may discover
that the doctor's busy schedule allows him to see the accused less frequently
than anticipated. 03
3.

Imprisonment
(a) With no special interest in treatment
Prison sentences, unaccompanied by any particular recommendation for
treatment, are frequently given to offenders whom the courts feel to be
96

See, R. v. Greedy, [1964] Crim. L.R. 669 and R. v. Cave, [1965] Crim. L.R. 448.
662.1 (1).
98 S. 663 (1) (a).
97 S.
99

R. v. Rideout, cited by Thomas, supra, note 57 at 259 n. 4.
loo R. v. Hill, [19631 Crim. L.R. 525.
101 Supra, note 25 at 333 has raised this problem.
102

Id.

1o3 Id.
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mentally ill. Sometimes such dispositions are rationalized on the basis that
simple incarceration, if for a long enough period, may itself bring about the
prisoner's rehabilitation. In Regina v. Jones,10 4 for instance, the Ontario Court
of Appeal sentenced an accused whom psychiatrists had diagnosed as suffering
from a personality disorder to twelve years imprisonment following his conviction on a charge of attempted murder. Arnup, l.A. justified the sentence
on the grounds inter alia that it might "assist in the rehabilitation of the
accused, even though the prognosis for the immediate future is very pessimistic
indeed."' 0 In a similar vein, the Model Sentencing Act prepared by the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency (U.S.A.) recommends long
sentences for dangerous offenders on the premise that "violent action is a
characteristic of the young rather than the old offender."'10 The purpose of a
lengthy prison term would be "to continue him until that period of his life
when release would be safe and rehabilitation likely.' 0 7 By *ay of contrast,
the Canadian Committee on Corrections were distinctly of the opinion that
long term imprisonment militated strongly against rehabilitation. In the Committee's words:
...a

person who has received a very long definite sentence, say 20 years, may in
fact be more dangerous at the expiration of his sentence and return to freedom
than when he was sentenced.:os

This argument would seem to strike also at what is perhaps the chief justification of long term imprisonment, namely, the protection of the public. Yet
judges frequently impose the maximum penalties prescribed for protective
purposes, and it is not surprising that mentally abnormal offenders who are
considered to be incurable rank as prime candidates for this form of sentencing. 0 9 A recent example of such an occurance is the Ontario Court of Appeal's
decision in Regina v. Fisher."10 In that case the accused, who was a reformatory inmate, had been convicted of beating up and stabbing a guard while
escaping from that institution. He received from the trial court consecutive
sentences of one and two years imprisonment on the escape custody and
wounding charges respectively. These were to be added onto the term he was
currently serving. On appeal by the Crown against sentence, however, a psychiatric report was ordered. It revealed that Fisher was a psychopathic personality who had spent most of his life behind bars - including a twenty-year
stint at Penetang's centre for the criminally insane. Quite understandably,
Fisher was said to be incurable and assessed as unsuitable for further psychiatric treatment. On these facts, the sentence on the wounding charge was
104 [1971] 3 C.C.C. (2d) 153.
10; Id.at 161.
100 Commentary to section 5 of the Model Sentencing Act. And see, Halleck, supra,

note 36, who has noted (at 285) that "the aging process in itself probably has more to

do with reformation than all our correctional endeavours combined."
10 7

Commentary to section 5 of the Act.

108 Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (Ouimet Report) (Ottawa:

Queen's Printer, 1969) at 262.
109 See, R. v. Aaorns, [1964] Crim. L.R. 484 and R. v. Saunders, [1965] Crim. L.R.
250, where the offender's apparent incurability was in each case a factor influencing the
Court to impose life imprisonment.
110 (1975), 17 Crim. L.Q. 246.
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raised to the maximum of fourteen years. What is interesting is that Houlden,
J.A. remarked in the course of his judgment that had it not been for the
accused's mental disorder, he would only have increased the sentence by
three years.
If it is true that imprisonment makes offenders more dangerous than they
were before being sentenced, it would seem that total protection of the public
can only be achieved by imposing sentences which allow for the unfortunate
effects that imprisonment has upon offenders. Psychotherapy not being an
option in the case of incurable psychopaths, we are left with the alternative
of permanent imprisonment."1 In the Fisher case this would only have be.en
possible through the subsequent certification of the accused or through his
being designated an habitual criminal in accordance with the procedure set forth
in sections 688 and 690 of the Code. Where the courts have had the option
of sentencing an incurable psychopath to life imprisonment, they have seized
the opportunity in the name of public protection. In R. v. Head,1 2 for example, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of an accused
who had been sentenced to a life term for raping a six-year-old girl. Considering the available psychiatric evidence and the fact that he had previously
been convicted of indecent assault on a young girl, the Court felt that rehabilitation was beyond question and that the public could only be safeguarded by depriving the accused of his freedom permanently, or at least
indefinitely.
Rehabilitation, incurability, and dangerousness are not the only criteria
upon which the courts have grounded their decisions to imprison mentally
abnormal offenders. A very popular alternative consideration is that of general
deterrence. This fact is quite surprising, not just in view of the widespread
disillusionment which the very concept of general deterrence has encountered
in recent years," x3 but because one would have thought it especially difficult
to deter irrationally motivated behaviour. Nevertheless, judges commonly inyoke the principle, seeing nothing peculiar in the deterrence of symptoms of
what they themselves view as an 'illness'.
Judicial reliance on the principle of general deterrence can be seen in
a great many Canadian criminal cases which involve disordered offenders.
R. v. Jones"4 involved an accused who was convicted on three charges of
indecently assaulting young girls and was originally fined a total of $450.
Psychiatric evidence showed that he suffered from "sexual repression" but
that there was little likelihood of his committing further such offences. Despite
the fact that the reporting psychiatrist had warned that imprisonment would
only worsen the accused's condition, the Ontario Court of Appeal substituted
"' Conversely, sentences of life imprisonment have on occasion been varied to

long fixed terms where the offender has been assessed as treatable on the grounds that

the indeterminate nature of the life sentence impeded rehabilitation. See, R. v. Donnelly
(1968), 52 Cr. App. R. 731.
112 [19711 1 C.C.C. (2d) 436.
113 See, generally, Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal Punishment (1958), 21
Mod. L. Rev. 117 at 121-25; Walker, supra, note 12 at 77-97; Wooton, Crime and the
Criminal Law (London: Stevens, 1963) at 97-101.
"4

(1956), 115 C.C.C. 273 (Ont. C.A.).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 14, NO. 2

a prison term of six months definite and twelve months indeterminate on each
count, the sentences to be served concurrently. The reasoning of the majority"r was expressed by Pickup, C.J.O. who said:
It may be that this particular respondent, after continuation of psychiatric treatment, will not repeat the offence and there is a possibility of his being cured of
his condition by such psychiatric treatment, but these are matters of grave uncertainty. I think I would agree that, so far as the condition of this particular
respondent is concerned, a prison term may be detrimental to his recovery, but in
my opinion the offence is too serious for punishment by a fine or by suspending
sentence and placing the respondent upon probation. It is said that the prison term
will not have any deterrent effect upon other persons who are truly sex perverts.
That may be so, but I do not think it justifies disregarding the deterrent effect
upon those persons whom sentence will deter and who might be disposed to com-

mit an assault of this character.' 16

With respect it seems unclear from this reasoning exactly whom the learned
Chief Justice sought to deter. Surely anyone who indecently assaults young
children can be fairly regarded as a "sex pervert"." 7 Yet the learned judge
admitted that those persons who were "truly sex perverts" would probably
not be deterred. Are we to assume that the sentence was aimed only at
deterring amateur sex perverts? Or at deterring normal individuals masquerading as sex perverts?
Laidlaw, J.A. rejected the views of Pickup, C.J.O. on the issue of
general deterrence. In a dissenting judgment he said:
Then would a term of imprisonment imposed on the respondent in the unusual
circumstances of this case deter others from committing criminal acts of sexual
misbehaviour? In my opinion it would not. Certainly it would not restrain others
who suffer from mental maladjustments or illness of a kind that makes them unable to resist the driving and overpowering sexual impulse to do a wrongful act.118

The Ontario Court of Appeal again adopted the theme of general deterrence in the case of Regina v. Doucet.1 9 That case involved an appellant

who was convicted of indecently assaulting a young boy and who had received from the trial court a sentence of imprisonment for two years less a
day definite and two years less a day indeterminate. This sentence was affirmed on appeal, the majority of the court apparently relying (as had the trial
judge) upon the opinion of a psychiatrist that a term of imprisonment would
deter not only the accused but other pedophiles as well from the practice of
their perversion. Brooks, J.A. dissented, however, on the grounds that the
doctor's evidence had been misconstrued, and that the goal of rehabilitation
outweighed that of deterrence. He felt probation with psychiatric treatment
was a more suitable sentence in the circumstances.
Once again the goal of general deterrence motivated the Ontario Court
Mi Aylesworth, Chevrier and Schroeder, JJ.A. concurring.
110 Supra, note 114 at 275.
117 A possible exception may be made in the case of mental defectives. See R. v.
Pascoe (1974), 17 Crim. L.Q. 142 where a mentally defective male was sentenced to
twelve months definite and twelve months indefinite for attempting to indecently assault
a seven-year-old boy.
118 Supra, note 114 at 280.
11) [1971] 1 O.R. 705.
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of Appeal in R. v. Murphy.120 In that case the accused had been convicted
on two charges of rape and one charge of attempted rape. He was sentenced
to imprisonment for a total of two years less a day definite and two years
less a day indeterminate plus three years probation. On appeal by the Crown,
however, the sentences were raised to a total of seven years imprisonment.
Of interest is the fact that the psychiatric report indicated that the accused
had responded well to treatment and was no longer dangerous to others.
Furthermore it suggested that a long stay in prison would impede his total
recovery. Nevertheless the court expressed its view that the original sentences were inadequate in that they failed to sufficiently take into account the
aspect of deterrence to others. 1 '
(b) With a recommendationfor treatment
Where an offender has been assessed as both dangerous to the public
and in need of psychiatric treatment, Canadian Courts have traditionally
given precedence to the need for public protection and treated the accused's
mental rehabilitation as a matter of secondary concern. While the priorities
here seem faultless they are, paradoxically, of no help whatsoever in determining the appropriate disposition for disordered offenders who have not
committed offences demanding life imprisonment on tariff principles alone.
mustrative of this problem is the case of Regina v. Wallace,122 an instance
where the Ontario Court of Appeal was called upon to assess the correctness
of a ten year sentence imposed on a paranoid schizophrenic for the offences
of robbery and assault. Acknowledging the fact that the accused's amenability
to treatment would decrease with the amount of time spent in prison, Brooke,
J.A. pondered:
If the primary object of the criminal law is the protection of society, how apt is
this sentence? Perhaps such a sentence as this one offers immediate protection to
society but it clearly does little to protect it for the future. 23

In these circumstances the accused's mental condition was considered as a
factor which could reduce the term of imprisonment from that which might
normally have been imposed. Substituting a sentence of four years for the
original ten, Brooke, J.A. said:
It is plain that a sentence the length of that imposed was very much more severe
punishment for this man than for a normal person, because of the terror he experiences, the danger of self-destruction 2 4 and the loss of amenability to treat(1972), 15 Crim. L.Q. 13.
See, also, R. v. Gunnell (1966), 50 Cr. App. R. 242 at 245-46 where the trial
judge refused to issue a hospital order and sentenced the accused to life imprisonment
instead saying:
. . . crimes of this kind... must... be dealt with in such a way as to make
plain that the law is concerned and ever will be concerned to protect people who
suffer as you caused those women to suffer by these quite appalling sexual attacks
that you made upon them. Punishment must be an element in this case, and that
punishment can only be achieved by imprisonment.
12 (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 95.
123 Id. at 100.
124 For an interesting discussion concerning the risk of mentally abnormal offenders
committing suicide see Blair, Life Sentence then Suicide (1971), 11 Med. Sci. and the
Law 162.
120
112
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ment.... The best future protection for society lies
in imposing a sentence which
25
will make the appellant's rehabilitation probable.

Surprisingly few Canadian courts have recognized the dilemma articulated by Brooke, J.A. In certain cases this fact is no doubt attributable to the
nature of mental disorder and type of offence concerned. Where, for example,
the accused is considered incurably deranged and has been convicted of an
offence punishable by life imprisonment, there is no compunction about imposing the maximum sentence. In Regina v. Hill 20 Jessup, J.A. reasoned
that:
When an accused has been convicted of a serious crime in itself calling for a
substantial sentence and when he suffers from some mental or personality disorder
rendering him a danger to the community but not subjecting him to confinement
in a mental institution and when it is uncertain when, if ever, the accused will be
cured of his affliction, in my opinion the appropriate sentence is one of life. Such
a sentence, in such circumstances, amounts to an indefinite sentence under which
the parole board can release him to the community when it is satisfied, upon
in the interest of the accused and the comadequate psychiatric examination, it 1is
27
munity for him to return to society.

Once a court has imposed a sentence of life imprisonment it has effectively extinguished any dependency of public safety upon the rehabilitation
of the offender. If oriented toward reform, however, the court may choose
to deal with the matter by a simple recommendation that the accused receive
whatever psychiatric help may be available to him while in prison. Thus in
Hill Jessup, J.A. said:
I would strongly recommend that the appellant receive psychiatric treatment and
judgment to the SolicitorI would request the Crown to forward a copy
128 of this
General and to the penitentiary authorities.

Similarly, in Regina v. Leech'2 9 the Alberta Supreme Court said:
Whilst under sentence the accused, though 0not legally insane, should be considered
as a suitable patient for psychiatric care.'S

Because the psychiatric facilities in Canadian prisons are notoriously inadequate,""' some judges may feel obligated to recommend that the offender
be transferred under section 19 of the Penitentiary Act'8 2 to a provincial
125 Supra, note 122 at

100.

(1974), 15 C.C.C. (2d) 145.
127 Id. at 147-48. The rule here was followed in Regina v. Haig (1974), 26 C.R.N.S.
247 (Ont. C.A.). The reasoning is similar to that of the English Court of Criminal
Appeal in R. v. Hodgson (1967), 52 Cr. App. R. 113.
28
Supra, note 126 at 148.
1
129 [1973] 1 W.W.R. 744.
130 Id. at 756.
151 In 1969 the Ouimet Committee reported (supra, note 108 at 237) that "the
cross-Canada picture indicates that most psychiatric services within correctional systems
120

are minimal and leave much to be desired."
132R.S.C. 1970, c. P-6:

19(1) The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into

an agreement with the government of any province to provide for the custody, in
a mental hospital or other appropriate institution operated by the province, of
persons who, having been sentenced or committed to a penitentiary, are found to
be mentally ill or mentally defective at any time during confinement in penitentiary.
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mental hospital outside the prison itself. In Regina v. Robinson 3 3 the Ontario Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of eight years imprisonment "for the
express purpose that this man receive at once such treatment as may be available to him at Penetang or such other hospital for treating persons with mental disorders as may be available."' 3 4 The problem with this recommendation,
as with the others cited, is that it is not in any way binding upon the penitentiary authorities. It therefore offers no assurance that the offender will receive treatment. As the Law Reform Commission has pointed out in a recent
working paper:
Sometimes such recommendations are followed, often they are not. Although it is
theoretically possible for prison authorities to transfer mentally disordered offenders to mental hospitals, in practice such transfers are rare. Because of the sparse
facilities for psychiatric treatment in prisons generally, many prisoners suffering
13
from serious mental disorders are detained without the prospect of treatment. 5

When a disordered offender is convicted of an offence not punishable
by life imprisonment his abnormality may modify the court's application of
normal tariff principles.' 3 6 In Regina v. Fisher, for instance, the court considered mental abnormality a factor which could quite properly increase a
sentence's duration from that which the offence's severity alone would have
rated. It should be noted, however, that public safety was the premise upon
which this decision rested. Where sentences are geared toward rehabilitation,
a popular proposition is that expressed by Norval Morris:
which would
over a criminal's life should not be taken in excess of that
37
be taken were his reform not considered as one of our purposes.'
...power

As Morris has himself pointed out,' 38 subscription to this philosophy is by no
means universal. Kadish has, for instance, asked:
Why should the rehabilitative purpose be subordinated to the deterrent, vindicatory
and incapacitative purposes? 13 9
'33 (1974), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 193.
1341d. at 198-99. Likewise in Regina v. Bradbury (1973), 23 C.R.N.S. 293 (Ont.
C.A.) at 298 the Court said:
In dismissing the appeal, the members of this Court wish to bring to the attention
of the penitentiary authorities the repeated statements emanating from the Mental
Health Centre at Penetanguishene that Bradbury requires long-term treatment in
a controlled setting such as can be provided by the Mental Health Centre and that
the Mental Health Centre is prepared to accept him for treatment.
135 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper: The Criminal Process
and Mental Disorder (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975) at 46.
'3 6Supra, note 51 at 272.
137 Morris and Howard, Studies in CriminalLaw (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964) at 175.
138 Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1974) at 18.
'39 Review of Morris and Howard, Studies in Criminal Law, (1965) 78 Harv.L.Rev.
907 at 908. A staunch believer in the primacy of rehabilitation is A. A. Bartholomew.
He has complained, supra, note 34 at 336, that:
It is almost impossible to undertake psychotherapy with a man on a fixed 'tariff'
sentence: apart from the rigidity of a fixed sentence, the tariff invariably is inappropriate to the particular man and his needs. Would anyone expect to be admitted
to, say, the surgical ward of a hospital for a fixed period; the period being decided
upon in terms of the 'commonest time'?
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Furthermore, if one accepts, as did Brooke, J.A. in Wallace, that the rehabilitation of dangerous offenders and the protection of society are inseparable
goals, one may justify the lengthening of sentences for rehabilitative purposes
by applying the reasoning used in Regina v. Fisher.Indeed, this is what seems
to have been done in Regina v. Bradbury.140 There the trial judge imposed
the maximum sentence of fourteen years imprisonment on a charge of wounding where the accused had been diagnosed as suffering from a "character disorder". Reliance was apparently placed on the opinion of the reporting psychiatrist that a very lengthy period of treatment would be necessary before
the accused ceased to be dangerous to others. In dismissing the accused's
appeal against sentence the Ontario Court of Appeal held that in addition to
the nature of the offence, the "urgent need for a protracted period of treatment'' and "the need for protection of the public"' 42 justified the sentence.
In actual practice, therefore, it seems that Morris' proposition has been
rather loosely adhered to. In its strictest sense, it suggests that the rehabilitative ideal (though it might give rise to a recommendation for curative therapy)
should play no part whatsoever in determining the length of sentence to be
imposed. But as Bradbury suggests, the courts have apparently adopted a
more flexible rule. If indeed a governing formula is to be found, perhaps it
is that put forward by the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Moylan 43 where
it said:
the court must first determine what are the limits of a proper sentence in
respect of the offences charged. Within those limits it may be perfectly proper to
increase the sentence in order to enable a cure to be undertaken whilst the prisoner
is in prison. But on the authority of Ford (supra) it is clear that it is not correct
to increase the sentence above that within the appropriate range for the offence
44
itself merely in order to provide an opportunity for cure.'
...

The Court further stated that it would not consider itself bound by this rule
in cases where the protection of the public was involved. Also worth noting
is the decision of the same court in R. v. Turner 45 where an exception was
made to the general rule that the effect of remission must be disregarded
when calculating the correct length of sentence. It was reasoned that:
when one is considering not punishment but considering reform or mental
treatment, something which is in the interests of the prisoner, it would be obviously
right for this court to take remission into consideration.1 40
...

4.

Hospital Orders?
In determining the length of imprisonment to which a disordered offender
should be sentenced, many judges find it virtually impossible to ignore the recommendations made in psychiatric reports. As a result, those judges who are
truly reform orientated find a way of scaling their sentences to the length prescribed for treatment purposes, while at the same time paying lip service to
140
'41

(1973), 23 C.R.N.S. 293.
Id. at 297.

142 Id.
143 (1969), 53 Cr. App. R. 590.
144 Id.

at 594.
1413 (1967), 51 Cr. App. R. 72.
40
1 Id. at 73.
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Professor Morris' rule. A dramatic example of this tactic in operation may
be seen in the recent case of Regina v. Boomhower.147 There an offender who
had been convicted of discharging a fire-arm with intent to endanger life was
remanded to the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre for pre-sentence
examination. Upon receiving evidence that the offender suffered from a personality disorder which would require up to five years of intensive psychotherapy, the trial judge imposed a sentence of seven years imprisonment. The
offender was thereafter certified under The Mental Health Act. On appeal
against this sentence, Martin, J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged that the learned trial judge had no doubt arranged for the accused's
indefinite certification, yet dismissed the appeal on the following grounds:
In our view the learned trial judge went to great pains to deal with this youthful
appellant in a very positive and enlightened manner designed to correct the personality disorder from which he suffers and thereby offer the best long term protection to the public. At the same time the sentence which he imposed upon the
appellant does not exceed what is an appropriate sentence in this case, having regard to the very serious nature of the offence committed, apart altogether from
the appellant's need for treatment.' 48

The reasoning here demonstrates some pretty fancy footwork on the part

of Martin, J.A. While the seven year term (technically the only sentence
imposed) may well have been justified by the gravity of the offence alone, it
is clear that trial court took power over the offender's life "in excess of that
which would [have been] taken were his reform not considered."
Under the English system of hospital orders an express statutory authority is provided whereby courts may accomplish, in a less make-shift fashion,
the ends sought in Boomhower. Section 60(1) of that country's Mental
Health Act, 1959149 enables judges to order a mentally disordered offender's
admission to and detention in a hospital. This power is exercisable over persons convicted of offences other than those for which a penalty is fixed by
law; or, in the case of magistrates' courts, over persons convicted of summary
conviction offences punishable with imprisonment. The authorization of all
hospital orders is conditional upon the following criteria being met.
(a) the court is satisfied, on the written or oral evidence of two medical practitioners...
(i) that the offender is suffering from mental illness, psychopathic disorder,
subnormality or severe subnormality; and
(ii) that the mental disorder is of a nature or degree which warrants the
detention of a patient in a hospital for medical treatment.... ; and
(b) the court is of the opinion, having regard to all the circumstances including
the nature of the offence and the character and the antecedents of the offender, and to the other available methods of dealing with him, that the most
suitable method of disposing of the case is by means of an order under this
section.

Section 60(2) of the Act further allows magistrates' courts to make hospital
orders without first convicting accused persons if satisfied both that they suffer
from mental illness or severe abnormality and that they are in fact guilty of
the offences with which they have been charged.
147 (1975), 20 C.C.C. (2d) 89 (Ont. C.A.).

148 Id. at 93.
149 7 & 8 Eliz., 2, c. 72.
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A key feature of the English hospital order is that it may not be combined with any other sentence, such as a fixed term of imprisonment. It does
not run for any specified period and, although it lapses automatically at the
end of twelve months, it may be renewed indefinitely. Furthermore, it may
be coupled with a restriction order preventing the patient from being discharged without the permission of the Home Secretary. In proposing what
it has called a system of "hospital permits", the Canadian Committee on
Corrections has expressly rejected these elements of the English model
As its name suggests, the permit system places the final power over the
patient-prisoner in the hands of the hospital rather than the court. In the
words of the Committee:
It was felt that hospital officials should be able to determine who, based upon
appropriate admission criteria, would be admitted to and discharged from psychiatric facilities.... Where it is indicated that an offender would benefit from
treatment in a psychiatric facility, the court should be empowered to authorize
placement of the individual in such a facility. This placement should be conditional
upon the circumstances being such that his eligibility otherwise met the terms of
the mental health legislation in the particular province involved.150

Preferring that the permits be combined with relatively short sentences of
imprisonment, the Committee has recommended that the period of hospitalization not exceed the length of sentence unless the patient-prisoner is continued as an involuntary patient under provincial mental health legislation.
If adopted, the Committee's permit proposal would do little other than
to add a Parliamentary blessing to what may currently be achieved in an
unofficial manner. Indeed, the Court in Boomhower remarked that:
...the

learned trial judge has utilized existing provincial mental health legislation
and facilities, and arrangements made between the provincial mental health authority and the penitentiary services to achieve a result similar to that envisaged
by the system of hospital permits recommended by the Report of the Canadian
Committee on Corrections.'51

D.

CONCLUSION
The principle that "like cases should be treated alike" would seem to
be nothing more than an empty platitude in the case of mentally disordered
offenders,'5 2 A survey of recent Canadian decisions reveals marked disparities
160 Supra, note 108 at 235.

151 Supra, note 147 at 93. The fact that this result can be achieved is apparently
not known to all judges, however. In Regina v. Robinson (1975), 19 C.C.C. (2d) 193
at 198 Brooke, J.A., of the Ontario Court of Appeal, expressed his opinion that the
inadequacy of a recommendation that the offender be transferred from prison to a
mental hospital "points up the importance of the Committee's recommendation that
hospital permits ought to be available". In the case of R. v. H., reported in the Toronto
Telegram on September 20, 1962, the judge "bemoaned the fact that there are no laws
which would allow him to send the boy to a centre for psychiatric treatment, but said
he would recommend that H get the treatment he needs." Commenting on this case,
Swadron, in his book Detention of the Mentally Disordered (Toronto: Butterworths,
1964) at 418 has asserted: "The most a sentencing Court can do in Canada under the
present law is recommend that the prisoner receive psychiatric treatment."
152 This may indeed be the case with all types of offenders. See the studies cited by
Hood and Sparks, Key Issues in Criminology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970) at
141-70.
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between the 'sentences imposed on persons who have committed the same
crimes and who apparently suffer from the same disorders. As demonstrated
by the Jones'53 and Allen'5 4 cases, a pedophile convicted of indecent assault
may on his first offence receive a suspended sentence with probation or, alternatively, a term of imprisonment, depending on the trial judge he has
drawn.' -55 A homosexual convicted of gross indecency may be fined as in R.
v. Five Accused Persons'56 and Boisvert and Lupien;15 7 may be placed on
probation with psychiatric treatment as in Holte and Landry,'58 La Chance
and Bliss,15 9 Desjarlaisand Ferguson,160 and Hermann and Singer;'61 or may
1 2 Turpin,1es and DeSeve. 6 4
be imprisoned as in Marshall,'
A psychopath
sentenced to life imprisonment may be recommended for transfer to a mental
1 5 or Bradbury,166 or he may be
hospital as in RobinsonP
considered beyond
67
salvation as in R. v. Head.
It is obvious that not all judges rely upon psychiatry as an aid to sentencing. In studying the frequency with which psychiatric reports were used
by Ontario magistrates, Hogarth found that such information was requested
in only 4.3 per cent of the cases sampled. 168 Though one would have thought
this figure to correspond roughly with the number of offenders perceived as
mentally abnormal, it was discovered that a great many magistrates refrained
as a matter of policy from seeking psychiatric information even where evidence of mental disorder existed. 69 Still, it would appear that most sentencing
judges who suspect mental disorder do request psychiatric reports. 70 As the
case of Jones and Murphyl7' indicate, however, the information contained in
such reports may not always influence the judge in determining sentence.
Even where it is relied upon, the result may be the imposition of sentences
which involve no element of psychiatric therapy whatsoever. 72
153 Supra, note 104.

15 4 Supra, note 92.
155 The Jones and Allen cases have been compared by Jaffary, Sentencing of Adults
in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) at 21-22.
156 Supra, note 58.
157 Supra, note 60.

158 Supra, note 73.
159 Supra, note 74.
160 Supra, note 75.
16 1 Supra, note 76.
162

Unreported, but cited by Sanders, supra, note 73 at 27.

Id.
164 Id. at 28.
165 Supra, note 133.
163

166 Supra, note 134.
67

1

Supra, note 112.

168 Supra, note 13 at 240.

169 Id. at 238.
170 Id.
171

Supra, notes 114 and 120.

172

See, Fisher, supra, note 110 and Doucet, supra, note 119.
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In all probability, those judges who do in fact impose psychotherapeutic
sentences act on the basis of certain fundamental assumptions about mental
disorder and psychiatry. The first is that the accused suffers from a mental
"illness" which is capable of being "diagnosed". In this regard it must be
stated that the reliability of modem psychiatric diagnoses is a matter of considerable controversy. While sceptics have attacked them for their "gross
unreliability", 173 zealots have hailed them as being "as accurate as those in
tuberculoses, communicable disease, or other illness."' 1 4 With respect, this
latter view seems the less plausible of the two. The fact that psychiatrists
frequently disagree in their clinical judgments is one well known to members
of that profession and to lawyers and judges as well. 175 The reason for this
lack of consensus is not entirely clear. Of the several possible explanations
which have been offered, one is the existence of the various schools of thought
which have developed in the field; 17 6 divergent clinical judgments may be
the result of differing theoretical bases. Another explanation is the susceptibility of each doctor's observations to subjective coloration;' 7 7 individual personalities and experiental backgrounds may account for differences in diagnosis even amongst members of the same school of thought. Perhaps the most
compelling explanation is that offered by Thomas Szasz, namely, that there
is in fact no such thing as mental illness to begin with. How can anyone
diagnose a disease which does not exist? Szasz's theory is simply that:
Strictly speaking.., disease or illness can affect only the body. Hence, there can

be no such thing as mental illness. The term 'mental illness' is a metaphor.' 78

But even the non-existence of mental illness should not in itself remove
73

Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and Correction
(1958), 23 Law and Contemp. Problems 650 at 666.
174 Bennett, Hargrove and Engle, The Practice of Psychiatry in General Hospitals
1

(1956) at 91, quoted by Hakeem, id. at 662.
175 See, Hakeem, supra, note 173 at 660-68; Campbell, Sentencing: The Use of
Psychiatric Information and Presentence Reports (1972), 60 Ky. L. J. 285 at 313-15;
and Beck, Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Study of Consistency of Clinical
Judgments and Ratings (1962), 119 Am. J.Psychiatry 351 where psychiatrists who
participated in a study were found to be unanimous in their diagnoses only slightly more

than half of the time. But see, Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the Law (1953) at 23,

quoted by Hakeem, supra, note 173 at 662, where it is asserted that
There is general agreement among psychiatrists upon the essential facts and the
significance of words and actions, although there are minor differences in theory.
The differences and disagreements are much exaggerated by the critics, and constitute one of the alleged reasons for the reluctance of the legal profession to accept
any more readily than they do psychiatric concepts and teachings.
70
1
Supra, note 27 at 244. But see, Watson, "Untying the Knots: The Cross-Examination of the Psychiatric Expert Witness" in Sugarman, Examining the Medical Expert
(Ann Arbor: Mich. Institute of Continuing Legal Education, 1969) at 16, where the
author has stated that since today's psychiatric theories are all genetic in concept, the
differences between Freudian and Jungian background are really inconsequential.
177 Diamond and Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations (1965), 63 Mich. L.Rev. 1335 at 1341.
78
Supra, note 11 at ix. The author asserts (at 37) that even organic illnesses
1
which are said to affect the mind are not mental illnesses. Rather, they fall into the class
of "bodily diseases which, by impairing the functioning of the human body as a machine,
create difficulties in social adaptation."
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an offender from the ambit of psychiatric intervention. Although few would
disagree as to psychiatry's ability to alter human behavior, a more important
question is whether psychiatry can alter behaviour for the better (i.e., affect
a "cure" for the alleged illness). This brings us to our second assumption,
namely, that psychiatry can in fact do just that. As Nigel Walker has noted, 171
the effectiveness of present day psychotherapeutic techniques is a hotly debated issue. Halleck, among others, has observed that "in spite of the enormous effort that has gone into treatment of the mentally ill, there is no
scientific proof of the effectiveness of psychotherapy."' 180 Ardent anti-psychotherapists such H. J. Eysenck have cited studies indicating that persons
suffering from certain disorders are as likely to recover spontaneously as be
cured by psychotherapy. 181 Halleck has questioned the significance of such
findings, however, by pointing out that terms such as "cure' and "psychotherapy" are ambiguous and hard to define. He has written:
The problem with evaluating psychotherapy in the correctional setting is not only
a lack of precision in defining what changes we are looking for but also an utnjustified carelessness in deciding what is to be called psychotherapy. There is an
unfortunate tendency to label any conversation which takes place between a professional and an offender as psychotherapy. We can hardly expect the offender
who receives five to fifty hours of therapy with an untrained psychiatric resident

or social worker to respond in the same way as a wealthy neurotic who 82receives
500 to a thousand hours of therapy from a highly skilled psychoanalyst.1

Although he has not cited the evidence being relied upon, Walker has
concluded that "there is still more support for the claim that [psychotherapy]
is effective!' 1- in the treatment of certain mental disorders. In all likelihood,
those judges who impose sentences which involve psychotherapy subscribe
to this view.
Implicit as well in the psychotherapeutic sentence is another very crucial assumption: that the enforced treatment of mental disorder is morally
and ethically sound. Once again, however, the consensus on this point is far
from unanimous. Opinions range from complete endorsement of the coerced
cure (with apparent disregard for the nature of the offence involved 184) to
utter rejection of all non-contractual psychotherapy.ls 5 Although the psychiatric treatment of probationers needn't necessarily violate the doctrine of
voluntary informed consent, 186 it has been suggested that the same cannot be
said with regard to prison inmates. 187 In Kaimowitz et al. v. Department of
Mental Health (Mich.)188 the Wayne County Circuit Court was of the opinion
179 Supra, note 12 at 111.
180 Supra, note 36 at 338.
81

1 Eysenck,
82

Crime and Personality (London: Paladin, 1970) at 151-52.

1 Supra, note 36 at 339.
183 Supra, note 12 at 111.
184 Supra, note 80.

185 See, generally, Szasz, The Manufacture of Madness (New York: Dell, 1970).
186 Supra note 87.
187 See, Burt, Biotechnology and Anti-Social Conduct: Controlling the Controllers
(1974), Ohio State Law Forum Lectures 1, referred to by Morris, supra, note 37 at 25.
188 Supra, note 84 at 25.
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that the incarcerated offender was "particularly vulnerable as the result of his
mental condition, ... involuntary confinement, and the effect of the phenomenon of 'institutionalization'." Nevertheless, Morris has stated:
I adhere to the view that it is possible to protect the inmates' freedom to consent
or not; that we must be highly sceptical of consent in captivity, particularly to any
risky and not well-established procedures; but
there seems little value in arbitrarily
excluding all prisoners from any treatment.18 9

What then is the proper role for the psychiatrist in the sentencing process? While some commentators subscribe to the view that "it is in recommending disposition where the psychiatrist ... can most helpfully assist the
court",100 others have concluded that psychiatric evidence should not be
admissible in court.191 Although the radical nature (and questionable wisdom) of this suggestion makes its implementation unlikely within the near
future, it is submitted that for the present psychiatric power must at least be
limited in a number of ways. Furthermore, the judge who wishes to impose
a psychotherapeutic sentence should be restricted by certain minimum rules
of conduct. With these purposes in mind, the following recommendations are
offered. They are not intended as a comprehensive guide to the sentencing of
mentally disordered offenders, but merely represent a skelton list of suggestions which come to mind as a direct result of the preceding discussion.
Only recommendations 1 and 9 would seem susceptible of legislative implimentation. The rest must remain as formulations of suggested policy.
1)

SECTIONS 543(2), 543(2.1) AND 608.2 OF THE CRIMINAL
CODE SHOULD BE REPEALED. IN THEIR PLACE THE FOL192
LOWING REMAND PROVISION SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED:
(1) A court judge or magistrate may, when of the opinion, supported by the
evidence or, where the prosecutor and the accused consent, by the report in writing
of at least one duly quailfied medical practitioner, that there is reason to believe
that a person who appears before him charged with or convicted of an offence,
suffers from mental disorder, remand the person, by order in writing, to a psychiatric facility for examination for a period not exceeding thirty days.
(2) The term "mental disorder", when used in this section, means any organic
disease which affects the brain or any mental disability.
(3) Each of the following, and only the following, shall be deemed to constitute
sufficient reason to believe that the person being remanded for psychiatric examination "suffers from mental disorder" within the meaning of subsection (1):
(a) the person has been charged with or convicted of an offence involving
serious violence against a member or members of his own family;
(b) the person has been charged with or convicted of an offence under sections 143, 145, 148, 149, 150, 153, 155 or 157;
(c) the person has been charged with or convicted of an offence the commission of which exhibited a bizarre or irrational quality;

189 Supra, note 37 at 25.
1 0 Slovenko, Psychiatry, Criminal Law, and the Role of the Psychiatrist (1963),
Duke L. J. 395 at 407.
191 Hakeem, supra, note 173 at 681.
102 Because the sections named apply to remands before verdict as well as before
sentence, the wording of the recommended provision allows for the provision's application in identical circumstances.
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(d) the person has exhibited a bizarre or irrational manner of behaviour in
the courtroom;
(e) the person is one for whom there exists another compelling reason (other
than those specified in subparagraphs (a) to (d)) for believing that he suffers
from mental disorder.
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3) where a person is remanded under this section
the court judge or magistrate shall, in the order in writing referred to in subsection
(1) specify in detail the circumstances which prompted him to remand the person
for psychiatric examination.
(5) Where the person being remanded for psychiatric examination under this
section has not been taken into custody or has been released by virtue of any
provision contained in Part XIV, the court, judge or magistrate shall stipulate in
the order in writing referred to in subsection (2) that the accused be examined
as an out-patient and that he not be confined against his will in the psychiatric
facility for any period of time in excess of that required for actual examination.
(6) A court, judge or magistrate shall not make an order under this section until
he ascertains from the senior physician of a psychiatric facility that the services
of the psychiatric facility are available to the person to be named in the order.
(7) Where an examination is made under this section, the senior physician of the
psychiatric facility shall report in writing to the judge as to the mental condition
of the person.
(8) Where a report is filed with the court under subsection (7), the clerk of the
court shall forthwith cause a copy of the report to be provided to the accused
or his counsel and to the prosecutor.

It should be noted that many of the safeguards contained in this provision could, of course, be circumvented by using the remand provision contained in provincial mental health legislation. This problem can only be solved
by repealing provincial remand provisions.
2)

PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS SHOULD NOT CONTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO WHAT SENTENCE SHOULD BE IMPOSED.
Although Bartholomew may have been correct in his assertion 93 that
the courts do in fact seek recommendations concerning sentence, such intentions on the part of the judges remain something less than admirable.
Szasz has argued that the judges who use psychiatrists in this fashion do so
in an attempt to escape responsibility and alleviate their own feelings of
guilt.'9 4 Moreover, the result is to place the psychiatrist in an unduly onerous
position; in effect, he becomes the sentencing judge. 19 5 This status may create
additional problems, should the reporting psychiatrist ultimately be the one
responsible for the offender's treatment; it is not the ideal basis for a therapeutic relationship.
193 Supra, note 42.

194 Szasz, Some Observations on the Relationship Between Psychiatry and the Law
(1956), 75 A.M.A. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry 297, cited by Campbell, supra,
note 175 at 311 n. 150.
195 Supra, note 185 at 56, where Szasz asserts that the mere statement of psychiatric
diagnosis is itself a form of sentencing:
...once a person is cast into the role of mental patient, there is a permanent
record of his deviance. Like the inquisitor, the psychiatrist can 'sentence' a person
to mental illness, but cannot wipe out the stigma he himself has imposed. In
psychiatry, moreover, there is no pope to grant absolute pardon from a publicly
afirmed diagnosis of mental illness.
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3)

PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS SHOULD CONFINE THEMSELVES TO
DIAGNOSES AND ASSESSMENTS OF TREATABILITY.
Regardless of the dispute concerning reliability of psychiatric diagnoses
and effectiveness of psychiatric treatment, these are the only two areas in
which psychiatrists claim to have expertise. For this reason, gratuitous
opinions on the subjects of non-psychiatric punishment (as opposed to 'punitherapy') and general deterrence (see, R. v. Doucet) 196 are both valueless
and prejudicial.
4)

'DANGEROUSNESS' SHOULD BE REJECTED AS A BASIS FOR
IMPOSING SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT.
This recommendation is one made by Norval Morris. The concept of
dangerousness, he has argued, "presupposes a capacity to predict future
criminal behaviour' u0 7 far beyond the technical ability which anyone (including psychiatrists) presently possesses. Therefore, he has stated:
The distressing moral problem inherent in this situation can be stated as 'whom
shall we trust?' For the time being my reply is 'nobody'. I believe that an effective
and just system of criminal justice can be constructed without reliance on increasing our power over offenders on the grounds of their predicted dangerousness.
Within the ambit of power defined by other purposes (most of them retributive),
we must frequently relate sentences and parole decisions to our best judgments
of the offender's dangerousness; but we should not rely on such inadequate judgments to raise the maximum of punishment.' 98

5)

THE NEED FOR PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT SHOULD NEVER
INCREASE THE LENGTH OF SENTENCE FROM THAT WHICH
NORMAL TARIFF PRINCIPLES DICTATE.
This, again, is Morris's proposition. 199 Strictly speaking, the length of
sentence should be determined entirely independently from considerations
concerning the length and type of treatment judged appropriate for the offender's disorder. Once this has been done, the offender's mental state should
be considered in mitigation of sentence only.
6)

THE EFFECT OF REMISSION SHOULD NEVER BE CONSIDERED
WHEN CALCULATING THE CORRECT LENGTH OF SENTENCE.
As the case of R. v. Turner200 demonstrates, an exception to the general
rule has been made where .the offender is considered to be in need of psychiatric treatment. Courts who wish to tailor the length of sentence to correspond to the period prescribed for effective treatment allow for the offender's parole eligibility. The reason offered by the English Court of Appeal
for doing this was that psychotherapy was obviously "in the interests of the
I9OSupra, note 48.
197 Supra, note 37 at 62.
198 Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal (1967-68), 41 So. Cal. L. Rev.
514 at 532-3.
19 Supra, note 137.
200
Supra, note 145.
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prisoner." 201 With respect, this is insufficient justification. In the words of

Thomas Szasz, it "ignores the possibility that the alleged sufferer ... might
prefer to be left alone ... .,,202 Though no doubt the Court in Turner was
motivated by the best of intentions, one would be wise to consider Samuel
203
Johnson's warning that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
WHERE PSYCHOTHERAPY IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE,
THE TYPE OF TREATMENT EMPLOYED SHOULD BE NO
MORE DRASTIC THAN THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENCE
MERITS.
This recommendation is similar to one proposed by Kittrie in his Therapeutic Bill of Rights. In section 8 he has stated that "any compulsory treatment must be the least required reasonably to protect society.1 20 4 It is submitted that this section does not go far enough in safeguarding the disordered
offender against disproportionate curative treatment. Under Kittrie's proposal,
a relatively innocuous fetishist could be subjected to radical behaviour therapy
if that was the only way to protect women from having their panties stolen
from their clotheslines. It is contended, however, that prolonged treatment
with electroshock, emetics, psychotropic drugs or other aversive stimuli would
be too severe a penalty for the crime of petty theft.
7)

Because psychotherapy is often hard to distinguish from punishment, the
above recommendation may be thought of as another expression of the principle of "limited retribution". The principle, in Walker's words is that "the
unpleasantness of a penal measure must not exceed the limit that is appropriate to the culpability of the offence." 20 3 The recommendation herein stated
may perhaps more accurately be referred to as one of "limited reformation";
it seeks to protect the offender from excessive rehabilitation whether that
process be unpleasant or enjoyable.
WHERE POSSIBLE, PROBATIONARY PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT SHOULD BE VOLUNTARY.
Ideally, disordered persons who are placed on probation should be
advised to undergo therapy (as in the cases of Regina v. H.-20 3 and Regina v.
Allen207 ) rather than having treatment made a formal condition.
8)

9)

THE CRIMINAL CODE SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROVIDE
FOR A SYSTEM OF HOSPITAL ORDERS.
The provision should look something like this:
(1) Where a person convicted of an offence is sentenced to imprisonment the

201

Id.

202 Supra, note 185 at 16.

Quoted by Szasz supra, note 185 at xviii.
Kittrie, The Right to be Different (Baltimore: Pelican, 1973) at 404.
2
o5
Supra, note 12 at 31.
2
o Supra, note 91.
2
o7 Supra, note 92.
203

204
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court shall, upon application, hear evidence as to whether the offender is suitable
for a hospital order.
(2) Where the following conditions are satisfied, that is to say (a) the court is satisfied, on the written or oral evidence of at least two
psychiatrists
i) that the offender is suffering from mental disorder; and
(ii) that the mental disorder is of a nature or degree which warrants
the detention of the offender in a hospital for psychiatric treatment;
(b) the offender has consented in writing to an order under this section; 208 and
(c) an appropriate psychiatric hospital has agreed in writing to accept the
offender as a patient;2 09
the court may by order authorize his admission to and detention in such
hospital as may be specified in the order.
(3) An order for the admission of an offender to a hospital (herein referred to as
a hospital order) shall not be made under this section unless the court is satisfied
that arrangements have been made for the admission of the offender to that
hospital in the event of such an order being made by the court, and for his admission thereto within a period of twenty-eight days beginning with the date of
the making of such an order.
(4) A hospital order shall be sufficient authority (a) for a peace officer or any other person directed to do so by the court to
convey the patient to the hospital specified in the order within a period of
twenty-eight days; and
(b) for the managers of the hospital to admit him at any time within that
period and thereafter to detain him in accordance with the provisions of
this section.
(5) No person detained in a hospital under the authority of a hospital order shall
be discharged or transferred therefrom prior to the expiration of his sentence
unless parolled or transferred to a correctional institution in accordance with subsections (8) and (9) of this section.
(6) No person shall be detained in hospital under the authority of a hospital
order for a period of time longer than the duration of his sentence.
(7) Nothing in this Part shall be deemed to affect the offender's eligibility for
parole. 10
(8) An offender who has been made the subject of a hospital order may at any
time request that the balance of his sentence be served in a correctional institution,
in which case effect shall forthwith be given to that request. 21 1
(9) A hospital that has agreed to accept the offender as a patient in accordance
with subparagraph (2) (c) of this section may, if it considers the offender to be
no longer suitable for treatment, request that the balance of the offender's sentence
be served in a correctional institution, in which case effect shall forthwith be given
to that request.21 2
(10) An offender serving his sentence under a hospital order is deemed to be
serving his sentence in prison for the purposes of escapes and being at large without
1
lawful excuse.A 3
(11) A court's decision to impose or not to impose a hospital order may be
2 14
appealed in the same manner as any other sentence of the court.
208 This was suggested by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in its recent
working paper, supra, note 135 at 47.
209 Id.
210 ld.
211 Id.
212 Id.
21a Id.
214 Id. at 48.
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This provision is basically an embodiment of what can already be
achieved informally; 15 as mentioned earlier, many judges are either unaware
of the possibility of such procedure, or else wary of its propriety. The purpose
behind codification would simply be to alert judges that such an alternative
exists. The key element of the provision set out above is the consent of the
offender (subsection 2(b)). If an offender himself wishes to be hospitalized
rather than imprisoned, and the court and psychiatric facility are agreeable,
there would seem to be no good reason why he should not be. Unfortunately,
the enactment of this provision would not preclude an offender from being
involuntarily hospitalized by the informal means discussed earlier. Provincial
mental health legislation, unless amended, could still be used as a means
of circumvention.
One final word. It is by no means suggested that hospital orders,
whether consensual or not, are an effective means of dealing with disordered
offenders. From the standpoint of repeated hospitalization and recidivism,
the English system has been described as "not spectacularly successful. 210
215 See, generally, text, Part C (4): Hospital Orders?
2

16 McCabe, Rollin and Walker, The Offender and the Mental Health Act (1964),
4 Med. Sci. and the Law 231 at 244.

